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Why Central Asia, a reader might ask? 
Disclosure is in order: my interest in the book 
under review stems only partly from my ongo­
ing preoccupation with international law 
and its impact on legal systems and national 
legal consciousness in the Global South. As a 
scholar of  international law based in the UK 
but born and raised in Central Asia, I am an 
“accidental comparativist,” simultaneously 
an insider and outsider, seeking rational expla­
nations to my own personal encounters with 
Central Asian legal culture. To some readers, 
the region is perhaps most notable “for the 
historical obscurity into which it slipped in 
the fifteenth century” (at 1). To others, it is 
the land abundant in natural resources and 
lucrative market opportunities over which 
Russia, China, and the West vie for influence. 
To Scott Newton, it is a unique laboratory of  
constitutional experimentation and develop­
ment. As he notes at the outset, the independ­
ent Central Asian states sprang into existence 
at a time when “global constitutionalism had 
become an authoritative . . . international 
discourse” (at 2). Yet the constitutional nar­
rative he offers goes well beyond the consti­
tutional texts to the constitutional systems or 
orders of  the Central Asian states, uncovering 
their otherwise hidden historical and political 
underpinnings.
Constitutions rarely make an absorbing 
reading, and the texts of  Central Asian consti­
tutions are not an exception. Despite a tremen­
dous transformation that higher education 
and research in Central Asia have undergone 
over the last three decades, even the law­
yers trained in one of  the ’stans (Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and 
Kyrgyzstan) would find it difficult to disagree 
with Newton that constitutional commentary 
and analysis in the region remains doctrinal, 
inoffensive, and uncritical (at 7). Newton’s 
book is therefore a welcome and very timely 
contribution—the first of  its kind—to critic­
ally analyze constitutional developments in 
this hitherto underexplored region. The vol­
ume very helpfully begins with a brief  con­
stitutional overview of  Central Asian states. 
Chapter  1 offers a constitutional profile for 
each state, its history, background, and so­
called constitutional essentials (formal struc­
ture of  government and system of  rights). 
This is followed by a meticulously researched 
and expertly argued Chapter  2 discussing 
“red origins” of  Central Asian constitutional 
orders, and Chapter  3 on their constituent 
influences and processes. The following three 
chapters, respectively, focus on three principal 
sites of  constitutional power—presidents, par­
liaments, and courts. An uninitiated reader 
(and perhaps even those with the expert and 
first­hand knowledge of  the region) are likely 
to appreciate Chapters  7 and 8, which ani­
mate the legal exposition of  the otherwise 
dry constitutional particulars with lively, inci­
sive insights into the material underpinnings 
beneath the evolving rules and institutions 
of  economic governance as well as informal 
economic practices which the modern consti­
tutions of  the Central Asian states have vari­
ously preserved, enabled, and reproduced. 
Chapter  8 rounds out the discussion by off­
setting constitutional rules and institutions 
with insights into the lives affected thereupon: 
titular and devolved nations, minorities, their 
language, culture, religion, and local govern­
ance traditions.
To this reader, the volume under review 
stands out for its uniquely rich and dynamic 
exposition of  Central Asian constitutional­
ism from historical–legal and political science 
points of  view. While Central Asian studies 
have recently blossomed into a discipline in 
its own right and generated a rich seam of  lit­
erature, there is an extremely limited body of  
knowledge on the region’s legal tradition and 
its most recent developments.1 As such, the 
1 Some notable writings shedding light on the law, 
policy, and legal culture in Central Asia include 
Akbar Rasulov, Central Asia and the Globalisation 
of  the Contemporary Legal Consciousness, 25 
Law & Crit.163 (2014); Eurasian EConomiC 
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book is likely to also capture the imagination 
of  legal historians, those with an interest in 
post­colonial studies and scholars of  modern 
constitutionalism. Without merely summariz­
ing the content of  each chapter, the remain­
der of  this review will outline the key lessons 
Newton’s tome offers to different categories of  
legal scholarship.
While not being a legal historical treatise 
in the true sense, The Constitutional Systems 
of  the Independent Central Asian States offers 
a compelling case study of  legal development 
set in a unique socio­historical context and 
in a region known for its rich and complex 
tapestry of  culture and traditions. Yet legal 
historians and socio­legal scholars may also 
be puzzled by the absence of  any evidence 
anywhere in the Central Asian legal texts of  
“patriotism” by which constitutional norms 
would be “stitched into the fabric of  national 
life and traditions, defining not just reflecting 
national culture” (at 7). After all, constitu­
tions are “charters for national communi­
ties typically held to cast an eye backwards 
and forwards: retrospectively to reflect . . . 
national culture and traditions, and pro­
spectively to project a future civic identity” 
(at 110). Newton explains the lack of  pre­
constitutional indigenous cultural influence 
in the Central Asian constitutions by point­
ing to the latter’s red origins. By the time 
constitutionalism arrived in Central Asia 
primordial cultural forms had long been 
reconceptualized in Soviet terms (at 110). 
Newton does not deplore the Sovietization 
of  Central Asian legal traditions but rather 
draws the reader’s attention to its profound 
transformative effects on the region and its 
subsequent patterns of  engagement with 
all things constitutional. “Central Asian 
states have derived their constitutional tradi­
tions not so much from a supremely tyran­
nical or totalitarian source . . . as from one 
of  the very few examples of  radically novel, 
comprehensive experimentation in history” 
(at 56). One of  the constitutive Soviet influ­
ences on the region is the fact that the USSR 
was the world’s first “comprehensively and 
formally multinational federation.” Once 
in control over the most extensive overland 
colonial empire, Bolsheviks devised a hith­
erto unparalleled constitutional framework 
for cultural or ethno­linguistic pluralism by 
juridifying and institutionalizing ethnicity 
on a scale that “eluded the imagination and 
the resources of  any colonial power” (at 63). 
It is to this “unlamented monument to the 
twentieth century constitutional imagina­
tion” that Central Asian states owe their very 
existence, collective identities, mangled car­
tography, and enduring ethno­nationalism.
Nor do the constitutional texts of  the 
Central Asian states bear any Islamic fea­
tures—the phenomenon which Newton 
too ascribes to the Soviet cultural project. 
Central Asian Islam, along with other pri­
mordial traditions and embedded values, 
could not be repressed without threaten­
ing the Soviet cultural project; instead, it 
was Sovietized through a complex proc­
ess of  regulation, negotiation, and recep­
tion. To Newton’s discerning eye as a “legal 
Kremlinologist,” all the Central Asian states 
appear to be by and large loyal to the Soviet­
borne Russian legal categories, vocabulary, 
and logic (at 103). One, however, could dis­
agree as to the extent of  the enduring role 
of  Russian legal language and conceptual 
vocabulary in Central Asian legal culture. 
Although the pull and prestige of  Russian 
legal language are still palpable, decades 
of  donor­funded legal reforms and scholar­
ship programs for lawyers are likely to have 
their effect on national legal consciousness. 
As Newton concedes, Europeanization as 
a Central Asian institutional project can­
not be dismissed. Anecdotal evidence from 
Kazakhstan, for instance, points to a grow­
ing recourse to English law and Western­
educated legal professionals as a means of  
signaling Kazakhstan’s commitment to an 
open and stable economic framework for 
intEgration: Law, PoLiCy and PoLitiCs (riLka 
dragnEva & katarina woLCzuk eds., 2013); and 
mahabat sadyrbEk, LEgaL PLuraLism in CEntraL 
asia: LoCaL JurisdiCtion and Customary PraCtiCEs 
(2018).
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foreign investors.2 As Russia itself  continues 
to be in the throes of  the Slavophil–Western 
dilemma (at 112)  it is entirely conceivable 
that the enduring Russian legal–cultural 
spell over the region’s constitutional tradi­
tions might ultimately wane, giving way to 
other formidable influences—not only those 
from the West but also from the rapidly 
growing neighbors to the east of  the border.
In Newton’s view, Central Asian constitu­
tionalist discourse is a story of  “the simulta­
neous push from the repudiation of  the Soviet 
past and pull of  the embrace of  the globalised 
present” (at 3). However, contrary to how 
it might have looked at the time, neither the 
repudiation nor the embrace was enthusiastic. 
One shared feature of  all Central Asian consti­
tutions—the vestige of  their Soviet past—is 
the notion of  a “deep state” typified by the 
overblown administrative apparatus and pre­
occupation with control over population, nat­
ural resources, and borders. The collapse of  
the USSR did not entail, as one might have 
expected, the total repudiation of  the Soviet 
ideal of  strong government. Rather, it was 
adapted in “a more reliable and stable local 
form”—to guard against disintegration and 
chaos faced by the newly orphaned republics 
(at 97). Just as the Soviet constitution was not 
designed to effectively limit the government 
(at 86), the Central Asian constitutions are by 
and large non­justiciable and the procedural 
mechanisms for the assertion of  individual 
rights are conspicuously lacking.
To Newton, the foremost manifestation of  
a hyper­centralized political system is Central 
Asian super­presidentialism—“a kind of  
informal colonisation by the executive of  the 
powers and prerogatives reserved to other 
components of  the state” (at 127). All five 
Central Asian constitutions grant parlia­
ment limited powers vis­à­vis government in 
comparison with powers the president enjoys 
vis­à­vis government (at 132). The Kazakh, 
Turkmen, and Uzbek constitutions also vest 
the president with the power to dissolve 
parliament (at 136). With the exception of  
Kyrgyzstan, presidents wield significant pow­
ers over the judicial appointments (at 138). 
To Newton, the centrality of  the president as 
a meta­branch of  government is reminiscent 
of  the transcendent status of  the Communist 
Party in the Soviet constitutional order. Yet he 
cautions against dismissing super­presiden­
tialism as abuse of  constitutionalism. Rather, 
in Central Asian constitutional discourse pres­
idency is construed as a steward for emerging 
institutions and a guarantor of  the constitu­
tional order itself  (at 150).
Yet, the USSR was also a “societal state”—
combining within itself  both a welfare 
(“maternal”) and a disciplinary (“paternal)” 
authority. Newton reminds us that Soviet col­
lectivism did not negate individual rights but 
subordinated them and qualified their exist­
ence (at 77). This “social” dimension remains 
conspicuously underdeveloped in the consti­
tutions of  the “’stans.” All the Central Asian 
constitutions guarantee a broad arsenal of  
fundamental rights but often without ade­
quate remedies and enforcement mechanisms. 
Another shared omission is the absence of  
expressly formulated rights of  minorities and 
marginalized and vulnerable populations (at 
226). Here, Newton’s book should be instruc­
tive both for the advocates of  world consti­
tutionalism and for its detractors. Newton 
deplores “world constitutionalism” for its fail­
ure to “appreciate the political economy of  tyr­
anny in this strategic frontier of  a new world 
order that is both resource­hungry and ter­
ror­obsessed” (at 25). The brief  but illuminat­
ing overview of  the history of  Central Asian 
encounter with global constitutionalism casts 
an unedifying light on the latter. Drawing as 
it seems on his first­hand involvement in legal 
reform projects that engulfed the region from 
the 1990s onward, Newton exposes an inher­
ent ideological bias underpinning the exter­
nally supported constitutional development 
project. The Western­sponsored democratiza­
tion agenda favored economic liberalization 
and civil and political rights over economic 
redistribution and economic and social rights. 
Western experts recommended the incorpor­
ation of  strong constitutional safeguards for 
2 See mavLuda sattorova, thE imPaCt of invEstmEnt 
trEaty Law on host statEs: EnabLing good 
govErnanCE? 86, 139 (2018).
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the pillars of  liberal economic order: private 
property rights and freedom of  contract. 
Yet no such concern was expressed over the 
redistribution of  such rights in the first place 
(at 108). Unsurprisingly, the first­generation 
constitutions remained silent on the subject 
of  the disposition of  inherited state assets (at 
109). One of  the crucial and enduring defi­
ciencies of  the Central Asian constitutions is 
the failure to regulate distribution of  wealth. 
This, Newton rightly stresses, is characteristic 
not just to the Central Asian states but also to 
world constitutionalist discourse (at 246).
International advocates of  global consti­
tutionalism have also been playing a part in 
reproducing certain neo­imperial and colo­
nial tropes. Having initially embraced (albeit 
ostensibly and less than wholeheartedly) 
Western constitutionalism as a badge of  pres­
tige and the admission ticket to “full interna­
tional citizenship,” the Central Asian states 
gradually grew weary of  inexorable scrutiny 
by their Western “constitutional elders” (at 
120). In the eyes of  externally sponsored good 
governance, rule of  law, and democratization 
experts, Central Asian states were seen to be 
in need of  international wardship—as world 
constitutionalism’s first graduating class (at 
121). Unsurprisingly, the narrative of  “imma­
turity and unreadiness” they have thus per­
petuated—remarkably redolent as it is of  
the historical “civilizing” mission shared by 
Bolsheviks and the Western colonial order—
was readily instrumentalized by the Central 
Asian leaders and continues to underpin their 
transition discourse (at 121). Such narra­
tives are still discernible in the tone and con­
tent even in the more recent generation of  
externally sponsored law and development 
reforms. My own recent empirical research in 
international investment law reforms reveals 
how such initiatives contribute to entrench­
ing a (misplaced) belief  in superiority of  
foreign laws and foreign expertise and inferi­
ority of  local, home­grown capacity and legal 
solutions.
Newton’s analysis helpfully transcends the 
constitutional texts and instead engages with 
the material, economic foundations of  the 
Central Asian constitutional orders. In all five 
’stans, land, subsurface, and other resources 
remain in state ownership. However, Newton 
points out, there is also a profound diver­
gence between constitutional norms and 
actual economic practices (at 234). In each 
Central Asian state the true economic consti­
tution is the civil code, setting our basic legal 
rules for the new economic system, inspired 
by the Russian civilist tradition and drawing 
on a single template—the Commonwealth of  
Independent States (CIS) Model Code (at 235). 
Newton juxtaposes the commonality of  legal 
approaches with the different outcomes char­
acterizing the economic development of  the 
Central Asian states in recent years, thus rais­
ing the question of  the relevance of  legal rules 
to the economic outcomes (at 236). The new 
judicial structures—largely modeled on the 
Soviet­style tripartite court system (and his­
torically tainted by corruption and bribery)—
has risen to the challenge of  adjudicating a 
growing number of  commercial disputes. 
They have done so not for “consolidating and 
legitimizing newly introduced market rules” 
but because judicial decisions as well as judi­
cial appointments are regulated by commerce 
(at 240). New rules on the protection of  prop­
erty, contract, and enterprise also enabled “a 
bewildering interpenetration of  public and 
private interests, with the new economic 
elites availing themselves of  the law both in 
the process of  dividing the Soviet spoils and in 
creating new wealth” (at 248–249). This view 
is corroborated with evidence from emerging 
empirical studies revealing the resourceful­
ness with which the laws governing economic 
relations—global norms of  good govern­
ance—are harnessed to advance somewhat 
odious aims, such as when local oligarchs dis­
guise themselves as foreign investors to take 
advantage of  special incentives and privileges, 
to consolidate their wealth, and to escape 
national law and national judicial oversight.3 
Regrettably, the same set of  norms failed to 
transform an “apathetic public into a self­con­
scious pouvoir constituant” (at 101). The reader 
cannot but agree with Newton that, before all 
3 Id.
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else, constitutional orders serve to “safeguard 
and immunise the ruling power by forestalling 
ex ante and eliminating ex post any threat or 
challenge” (at 29).
Newton should be congratulated for the 
tone in which most of  the book is told. Rather 
than condemning or disparaging those behind 
the failed constitutional development project, 
Newton’s storytelling reveals profound curi­
osity, deep understanding, a sense of  empa­
thy, and, occasionally, a sense of  disquiet. His 
account of  Central Asian constitutionalism is 
not altogether pessimistic. He casts light on the 
incremental constitutional achievements of  
the last three decades, such as the professional­
ization of  legislature, a gradual sophistication 
of  legislative review and drafting processes, 
and growing engagement with constituents 
(at 160–161), as well as the development and 
maintenance of  centers of  judicial expertise. 
Among other things, Newton is fascinated by 
what he refers to as “the dynamic constitu­
tionalism of  Kyrgyzstan” (at 184) when in the 
wake of  the Tulip Revolution and in a manner 
unprecedented in other Central Asian or other 
post­socialist states, multiple alternative drafts 
of  the Kyrgyz Constitution were circulated for 
general discussion, not merely by the inter­
ested stakeholders among the emergent elites 
but possibly by the general public (at 185). 
“What if  this sort of  thing were the norm in 
world constitutionalism—what if  alternative 
conceptions of  the organization of  govern­
ment . . . were a matter of  simultaneous choice 
and comparison?,” ponders Newton. “What if  
the constituent process itself  were fully and 
openly politicised, if  not democratised?” (at 
185). The importance of  these questions has 
no regional boundaries. Superbly executed 
and absorbing, the book compels this reader to 
agree with the author that the Central Asian 
experience is emblematic of  the tensions and 
issues contemporary constitutional orders 
face everywhere.
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The age of  comparative constitutional law 
is upon us. In the last decade, the number of  
English­language monographs on the study of  
comparative constitutions has increased five­
fold. This “renaissance”1 of  comparative law has 
also borne witness to the migration of  research 
agendas from the well­traversed terrains of  
the “usual suspects”2 to new frontiers in Asia,3 
Eastern Europe,4 and Latin America5 as schol­
ars venture from the study of  established liberal 
democracies to new6 and fragile7 ones.
A significant voice in this chorus of  new 
scholarship is Mark Tushnet and Madhav 
Khosla’s edited collection of  essays on South 
Asia. As the world’s largest democracy, India 
is regularly featured in the research agendas 
1 ran hirsChL, ComParativE mattErs: thE rEnaissanCE 
of ComParativE ConstitutionaL Law (2014).
2 Id. at 4, 39, 241. See also ran hirsChL, towards 
JuristoCraCy: thE origins and ConsEquEnCEs 
of thE nEw ConstitutionaLism (2007); robErt 
LECkEy, biLLs of rights in thE Common Law 
(2015); aLEC stonE swEEt, govErning with 
JudgEs: ConstitutionaL PoLitiCs in EuroPE (2000); 
viCki JaCkson, ConstitutionaL EngagEmEnt in a 
transnationaL Era (2010).
3 Po JEn yaP, ConstitutionaL diaLoguE in Common 
Law asia (2015); ConstitutionaLism in asia in thE 
EarLy twEnty-first CEntury (Albert H.  Y. Chen 
ed., 2014).
4 david kosař, PEriLs of JudiCiaL sELf-govErnmEnt in 
transitionaL soCiEtiEs (2016).
5 JuLio ríos-figuEroa, ConstitutionaL Courts as 
mEdiators: armEd ConfLiCt, CiviL–miLitary 
rELations, and thE ruLE of Law in Latin amEriCa 
(2016); César rodríguEz-garavito & diana 
rodríguEz-franCo, radiCaL dEPrivation on triaL: 
thE imPaCt of JudiCiaL aCtivism on soCioEConomiC 
rights in thE gLobaL south (2015).
6 tom ginsburg, JudiCiaL rEviEw in nEw dEmoCraCiEs: 
ConstitutionaL Courts in asian CasEs (2003).
7 samuEL issaCharoff, fragiLE dEmoCraCiEs: 
ContEstEd PowEr in thE Era of ConstitutionaL 
Courts (2015).
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